Shields wasted no time getting to work in the top of the first inning as he struck out Baltimore’s Nate McLouth and Chris Davis. However, Miguel Gonzalez, the Orioles’ starting pitcher, was equally impressive as he struck out Desmond Jennings, B.J. Upton, and Ben Zobrist in a row to conclude the inning. Shields recorded another strikeout against Adam Jones in the second inning, and Evan Longoria leadoff the bottom of the inning with a single to left field. However, the Rays remained scoreless in the second and third innings. Both Shields and Gonzalez kept up the trend as they each recorded a strikeout in the third inning.

The fourth inning started off well for Shields, who struck out Nate McLouth for the second time that night. But, Chris Davis hit a solo shot to center field, making the score 1-0. The bottom of the inning showed promise for the Rays’ offense as Ben Zobrist drew a walk from Gonzalez, who went on to strike out Jeff Keppinger for the inning’s final out. Shields struck out three of Baltimore’s batters between the fifth and six innings, as he also gave up a single to Nate McLouth in the sixth inning. Although Baltimore could not score a run in the sixth inning, Tampa Bay attempted to as Chris Gimenez singled to shortstop. Ben Zobrist drew another walk from Gonzalez, but both were left on base at the end of the inning.

Rays fans give James Shields a standing ovation after his complete game on October 2, 2012. Credit: US PRESSWIRE

Shields continued his rampage against Baltimore’s offense, as he struck out five batters in the seventh and eighth innings. However, Tampa Bay’s hitters could not produce any runs during the two innings. As Shields recorded his final two strikeouts in the top of the ninth inning, the Rays held out hope that they could at least tie the game in the bottom of the ninth. As Ben Zobrist drew his third walk of the night from reliever Jim Johnson, he was left on base for the third time as the Rays lost.

Although it was a sad night in Tampa Bay because they were out of the hunt for a Wild Card spot, it will now become a memorable night because Shields’ final game in a Rays uniform was nothing short of spectacular. In his previous start on September 21, Shields also had a terrific night as the Rays beat the Toronto Blue Jays 12-1. In the bottom of the first inning, Shields recorded the Rays’ 1,267^th strikeout of the season, earning them the American League single-season strikeout record.

It will be strange to see James Shields in a Royals uniform, since he was drafted by the Devil Rays in the 2000 amateur draft and has spent his entire career with the franchise. But, at least our final memories of Shields as a Rays player are also some of the highlights of his career and the franchise as well.

Keppinger’s BAbip (batting average on balls in play) in 2012 was .332, solidly above his .294 career mark. Part of the explanation is that Keppinger’s line drive rate in 2012 was 20%, a tick above his 19% career mark, but that certainly doesn’t account for such a big difference in BAbip. In fact, 16% of Keppinger’s flyballs were pop-ups on the infield (and basically automatic outs), easily the highest mark of any season of his career and nearly doubling his 9% mark from 2007 to 2011. How did Keppinger manage to cancel out so many pop-ups and not that many line drives to hit for such a high batting average and BAbip? Something immediately stands out: Keppinger had 20 infield hits, shockingly the most on the Rays, one more than both B.J. Upton and Ben Zobrist. Jeff Keppinger stole just 1 base, so he’s not exactly a speed demon, so how in the world did that happen?

On the season, Keppinger had a .251 BAbip on groundballs, a .113 BAbip on flyballs, and a .822 BAbip on line drives. What does that mean? For perspective, Keppinger has career .224 BAbip on groundballs, a .135 BAbip on flyballs, and a .702 BAbip on line drives, and the AL average in 2012 was a .237 BAbip on grounders, a .127 BAbip on flyballs, and a .709 BAbip on line drives. Looking at that, Keppinger was well above both his career and the league average in terms of BAbip on both groundballs and line drives while coming in decently below the average on flyballs. Particularly the difference from his 2012 line drive rate especially stands out as there’s just a .01 probability of his BAbip on line drives being as high as .822 if it’s true value should be .702. But the problem with splitting up BAbip by batted ball type like this is that all batted balls on the same type are not created equal. For example, there are line drives that would go for singles if they drop in and line drives that are lasers heading to the gaps for extra base hits. Looking at Keppinger’s batted ball tendencies, how did his batted balls differ from his career average and the career average?

Keppinger’s inflated BAbip on groundballs clearly has a lot to do with the 20 infield singles. Taking out the infield singles, his BAbip on groundballs would be just .157, which comes in below the league average of .169 without infield singles. But both with and without infield hits being part of the equation, a higher proportion of Keppinger’s groundballs went for extra-base hits than the league average, 8.8% compared to the 8.1% league average with the infield hits, and 20% compared to the 12.4% without them. The problem is that the sample size is so small- the entirety of Keppinger’s extra-base hits on groundballs was 4 doubles. However, it may be that Keppinger’s success on groundballs this season is that he was hitting groundballs harder than the average player, making them more likely to be singles. But we saw that so many of Keppinger’s groundball hits were infield singles, and don’t hard-hit groundballs that stay on the infield often turn into routine plays? That is the case once the fielder is able to come up with groundballs because he has plenty of time to throw. However, it does become harder for him to feel the ball cleanly. One thing that stands out about Keppinger’s season is that he didn’t reach on an error all season. Several of his infield hits had to be plays that could have scored errors or hits and were ruled hits. That means that Keppinger’s batting average should almost definitely be at least a few points lower than the .325 mark where it ended up. But it can’t be a bad thing that Keppinger has been hitting the ball harder, and although a disproportionate amount of his groundball hits came on the infield this season, that could be rectified without his BAbip on groundballs going down too much in coming seasons.

In terms of line drives, the exact opposite phenomenon is happening. Keppinger’s BAbip on line drives (.822) was so much higher than his career average (.702) and the league average (.709), but a much lower percentage of his line drive hits went for extra-base hits. Just 9.6% of his line drives were extra-base hits, less the half the league average of 20.5% and well below his 15.9% career average. (Note that we were using percentage of groundballs hits before and we’re the using percentage of Keppinger’s total line drives). Keppinger’s BAbip on line drives was very high, but watching baseball it does make sense that line drives into the shallow outfield are more likely to drop than ones to the deeper outfield because if you can get it past the infield, there’s a big gap between the infielders and the outfielders. Keppinger did hit a little bit more extra-base hits on flyballs than his career average, 13.2% of his flyballs compared to his 12.5% career average, although that’s still solidly below the AL average of 17.2% in 2012.

What really happened in 2012 is that Jeff Keppinger decided to trade most of the little power he has in exchange for hitting balls harder, albeit for singles more than anything else. Just 20% of Keppinger’s hits went for extra bases, his lowest mark since 2004, but it didn’t matter as Keppinger’s overall offensive performance was better than anything we’ve ever seen from him before. Weak groundballs are often the case of taking a big swing and being out in front and rolling over the ball. Keppinger didn’t take many big swings and was content just putting the ball in play and hitting the ball hard wherever he could, and the results were outstanding. Can Keppinger sustain anywhere near his 2012 performance? He’s likely due for a regression in terms of his BAbip on groundballs, and although his high BAbip on line drives makes sense, he will likely go down in that regard as well moving forward. But Keppinger made a big realization in 2012 as to what type of player he needs to be to achieve the most success, and whether his future comes in Tampa Bay or elsewhere, Keppinger will view this 2012 season with the Rays as a turning point.

Francisco played decently for the Rays in September, posting a .228/.270/.421 line (91 OPS+) with 5 doubles, 2 homers, and 8 RBI in 24 games. He received some starts in right field in place of Matthew Joyce and at least offensively he was better as Joyce managed just a .187/.291/.360 line. But was it such a good thing that Francisco was playing over Joyce? Both Baseball-Reference and Fangraphs have Francisco’s contribution to the Rays as slightly negative, -0.1 and -0.2 wins above replacement respectively. Francisco was halfway-decent offensively, but whatever he provided he essentially gave back with his defense. And although Joyce was probably worse, you never know whether he could have finally hit his stride if he was given the starts that Francisco took from him. There’s basically no good way to spin Francisco’s time with the Rays. He gave them nothing.

The cost of the Rays taking a shot with Francisco was Geith, 23, the Rays’ 39th round pick in 2011. Geith, a 6’5″, 175 lefty, was unequivocally great this season, going 0-3 with a 2.98 ERA, an 8.1 K/9, a 1.8 BB/9, and a 0.3 HR/9 in 31 relief appearances. Minor League Central also had his groundball rate at a robust 48.0%. Why would the Rays get rid of someone like that? The obvious answer is pure stuff, which isn’t too special. Geith appears to have projection remaining, but right now his fastball is just in the high-80′s. He does get a solid downward plane on it and commands it decently, but it’s nothing much. Geith’s best offering is his low-80′s slider, which features sharp, tight break and forced quite a few swings-and-misses this season. However, Geith’s poor fastball forces him to throw it so often and more advanced hitters will be able to recognize more easily and lay off, putting Geith in a bind. He also throws a changeup, but that hasn’t made much progress. Worst-case scenario, Geith becomes a situational lefty someday.

This isn’t a case where the Rays foolishly gave up a pitcher throwing in the mid-90′s for a month of a backup outfielder. Geith has just modest potential and the Rays were willing to risk that in exchange for a player they thought could help them make the playoffs. It didn’t work out, but the cost here certainly was not that high. The Rays lost this trade, but they had the right idea, trading an unimpressive prospect for a player in Francisco who had shown some ability in the past, slamming 15 homers in 2008 and 2009, and the Rays hoped he would be electrified by the thought of going from the last place team in baseball in the Astros to a contender, the Rays. In the end, the Rays lost this trade. But when you take enough calculated risks, some will work out, and maybe the next trade like this the Rays make will make a positive impact in the Rays’ performance and help them secure a playoff berth this coming season. Just because this trade looks bad now doesn’t mean it wasn’t the right move at the time. When Andrew Friedman sees another opportunity for a low-risk gamble, he’ll take it knowing that next time might turn it better.