Entering his junior year at UNC-Greensboro, Chris Mason had been best known is an athletic third baseman with good power potential. He also pitched on the side, but he didn’t throw overly hard and it looked like his future would be as a position player. However, everything changed Mason’s junior year. Joining UNC-Greensboro’s rotation full-time, Mason dominated opposing hitters, going just 6-7 but with a 2.88 ERA and an incredible 135-24 strikeout to walk ratio in 118.2 innings pitched. His 135 strikeouts beat Kevin Millwood‘s previous school record of 125. And although Mason still only threw in the 88-92 MPH range, scouts were convinced that his breakout season was far from a fluke. He showed control and command along nice late life on his fastball and paired it with a curveball that was a mix between a curveball and a slider in the low-80′s but continuously missed bats as Mason possessed a nearly unconceivable ability to locate it for a new full-time pitcher. Despite his unorthodox repertoire and background as a pitcher, Mason entered the 2005 MLB Draft as a highly-touted prospect, and it was the Tampa Bay Devil Rays that pulled the trigger on him at 56th overall in the second round.

After Mason endured such a major increase in innings pitched from 2004 to 2005, the Devil Rays were very careful with him in his pro debut, using him out of the bullpen even though they intended to develop him as a starter and keeping him on a strict pitch count, and he proceeded to dominate in 9 appearances at Short Season-A and 10 at Low-A, going 2-1 with a 1.87 ERA, 30-13 strikeout to walk ratio, and not a single home run allowed in 33.2 innings pitched. He was so impressive that the D-Rays took the training wheels off of him in 2006 as they sent him to start at High-A Visalia, and Mason had a rough season between throwing more innings than he ever had before and pitching in the hitter-friendly California League, but he still showed flashes as he went 12-10 with a 5.02 ERA, a 6.6 K/9, a 2.6 BB/9, and a 1.0 HR/9 in 27 starts, a relief appearance, and 152.1 innings pitched. Mason wore down at the end of the year as he faced a heavy workload and lost something of his fastball, but he continued to miss bats with his slurve and began integrating a changeup into his arsenal. The Devil Rays had to be a little concerned after Mason struggled the way he did, but they had to believe that everything would get better for Mason with a couple full years as a pitcher under his belt, and that’s exactly what happened in 2007.

Moving up to Double-A Montgomery, Mason delivered exactly the type of prolonged performance the Devil Rays had been waiting for, winning the Southern League’s Most Outstanding Pitcher Award as he went 15-4 with a 2.57 ERA, a 7.6 K/9, a 2.5 BB/9, and a 0.4 HR/9 in 28 starts and 161.1 innings pitched. Mason saw his fastball see a dip in velocity into the high-80′s, something that had to be disconcerting for the Devil Rays, but at the same time he continued to throw it for strikes and command it extremely well down in the zone, and his secondary pitches took a major step forward. Mason made strides getting more consistent sharp break on his breaking ball, and then his changeup suddenly emerged as his best offering with excellent arm action and great late bite. Mason tied his arsenal together with a deceptive delivery that made all his pitches harder to pick up. With his fastball velocity so low, Mason was going to be hard-pressed to be more than a 3rd of 4th starter in the major leagues. But either in that role or possibly as a late-inning reliever with his velocity seeing an uptick out of the bullpen, Mason had the ability to make an impact in the major leagues by the end of 2008.

Even as he succeeded, there were some inherent problems with Chris Mason. He showed great control and command of his high-80′s fastball, but he never got great sink on it, and especially at that velocity he was going to get hammered whenever he made a mistake. He did a great job locating his breaking ball, but its slurvy tendencies made it a pitch that was never guaranteed to beat upper-level hitters. Even if his changeup remained plus and his breaking ball remained effective, though, Mason was going to have to rely on them tremendously because his fastball was not a great pitch. All of those issues came to a head for Mason at Triple-A Durham in 2008. He started the season in the Bulls’ rotation and finished it in the bullpen, but no matter in which role he pitched, Mason  couldn’t get anybody out, going just 3-10 with a 6.21 ERA, a 7.5 K/9, a 3.4 BB/9, and a 1.6 HR/9 in 17 starts, 16 relief appearances, and 108.2 innings pitched. He allowed 19 home runs compared to 24 the previous three years as upper-levels hitters weren’t fooled at all by his fastball. And after Mason managed a 6.24 ERA in 24 appearances at Double-A in 2009, Mason drew his release. He signed with the Mets and made 10 appearances at three levels in their systems, but he was a minor league free agent following the season and the Mets weren’t interested in bringing him back. Other than an ill-fated comeback attempt at Independent Ball in 2011, that was it for Mason’s career at just 24 years old.

What can we learn from the story of Chris Mason? Quite a few things that can influence the way we look at Rays’ prospects moving forward. Mason’s Double-A performance shows that minor league stats, even at levels at high as Double-A and Triple-A, don’t necessarily mean very much and a pitcher’s repertoire is going to be the primary determining factor for his future performance. Mason’s Triple-A collapse shows that outstanding fastball command and control can only make up for a lack of velocity up to a certain point and pitchers dealing at low velocities are going to have an extremely hard time as they move up through the minor league ranks with a low velocity fastball unless it features great movement, and the same thing can be applied for a slurvy breaking ball. But one thing that is especially worth picking up on is that the Devil Rays let Mason go from his first full season to a minor league workhorse in his second and while correlation does not implying causation, thinking that his innings increase and loss of fastball velocity were not connecting in anyway is downright foolish. Doing something like that was a mistake that typified the general managerial tenure of Chuck LaMar, but even in 2006, Andrew Friedman’s first year as Rays Director of Baseball Operations (and de facto GM), he made the same mistake. When you have a talented but inexperienced pitching prospect, the temptation is to rush to build up his innings even if it may not be the best thing for his long-term health, but teams have to find a way to hold themselves back and if they don’t the results could be disastrous.

Going to college, Diekroeger’s biggest areas that he needed to polish up were his approach at the plate, specifically developing better plate discipline and tapping into his raw power. But he had gone to the wrong school to make that happen. The Stanford coaching staff has prompted plenty of criticism over the years by developing all of its hitters to have compact swings and gap-to-gap approaches. That works fine for a lot of hitters, but Diekroeger had the ability to be more than that. In any event, Diekroeger appeared to have made the right move going to college after he managed a great .356/.392/.491 line with 5 home runs in 55 games as a freshman. But even as he filled out from 170 pounds to 190 and lost a step in the process, his power simply never came as he hit just .292 with 2 home runs as a sophomore then .275 with 2 home runs as a junior. What could Diekroeger still do? He still showed the same great bat speed, but he was too aggressive at the plate and had not developed much pitch recognition. His speed had become only average and his range in the field had decreased, making his chances of profiling as a shortstop or centerfielder slim and his most likely destination second base, a corner outfield spot, or a utility role. At least his arm had stayed strong and his hands had improved, but Diekroeger’s stock was undoubtedly far below where it had been before entering the 2012 MLB Draft. The Royals selected Diekroeger with their 4th round pick, a far cry from where Diekroeger thought he would end up by the time his career at Stanford was through although he did sign for $500,000 compared to the $346,600 slot value as the Royals paid him extra to tempt him to sign with their organization and not go back to Stanford for his senior year. In his pro debut, Diekroeger finally brought out his power at the Royals’ Rookie Burlington affiliate, slamming 8 home runs in 52 games, one less than he did in his 168-game college career. However, he managed just a .208/.275/.366 line and struck out 60 times versus 18 walks even against younger competition, and his future is very much in question.

Would things have turned out the same way had Diekroeger signed with the Rays out of high school? Maybe they would have. Maybe his lean frame filling out and his sub-par pitch recognition skills were going to make his development a struggle even if the Rays had found the right hitting approach for him after signing him out of high school. But after the way his career has started, Diekroeger is left to ponder what could have been as the Rays shake their heads at what he’s become and move on.

Sandberg was perfect on paper for the fledgeling Devil Rays. (Credit: Poughkeepsie Journal)

The Devil Rays saw third baseman Jared Sandberg on the board in the 16th round of the 1996 MLB Draft, the first draft in the history of the young franchise. They were thrilled. Sandberg had the bloodlines- he was the nephew of at that point future Hall of Fame second baseman Ryne Sandberg. They hoped that he could crack the big leagues and play well, and if he didn’t, he was just a 16th round pick anyway.

The D-Rays had to be at least a little distraught when Sandberg hit just .169 in 22 games in 1996 with the rookie-level GCL Devil Rays. But suddenly Sandberg broke out the following season at the more advanced Rookie team in Princeton, posting a great .303/.404/.583 line in 69 games. He showed nice power, slamming 15 doubles, 5 triples, and 17 home runs while driving in 70, and he also showed nice speed, stealing 12 of 15 bases. One concern was that Sandberg did strike out 96 times versus 44 walks. But it was a nice season and the Rays hoped he could sustain that type of performance. Unfortunately, he could not.

Sandberg spent 1998, his age 20 season, primarily at Low-A Charleston, and he dipped to a .245/.349/.407 line with 26 doubles, 15 homers, and 79 RBI in 129 games. He did steal 17 of 20 bases, but the strikeouts were a major problem as he struck out 152 times versus 69 walks. But the next season, Sandberg showed some improvement, posting a .276/.350/.458 line with 24 doubles, 22 homers, 96 RBI, and 8 of 10 stolen bases in 136 games. He cut the strikeouts down to a better 133, although his walks fell to 51.

In 2000 between Double-A Orlando and Triple-A Durham, Sandberg played pretty well but played in just 70 games because of injuries, managing a .266/.350/.425 line with 18 doubles, 7 homers, 42 RBI, and 5 of 8 stolen bases, striking out 61 times versus 33 walks. (Presumably the injury was a lower-body injury as Sandberg was never a stolen base threat again.) But in 2001, Sandberg spent the year primarily at Durham and played pretty well, posting a .243/.338/.440 line with 18 doubles, 17 homers, 54 RBI, and 91 strikeouts versus 44 walks. The Devil Rays brought him up to the major leagues in August and it didn’t go particularly well as he hit just .206 with 7 doubles, 1 homer, and 15 RBI in 39 games posting a scary 45-10 strikeout to walk ratio.

In 2001, the D-Rays started Sandberg at Triple-A and he played well in 30 games, posting a .281/.369/.465 line, and the D-Rays brought Sandberg back up. Sandberg’s line was just .229/.305/.444 and he struck out 139 times, the 5th-most in the AL despite just 102 games, and he walked just 39 games. But he showed nice power, slamming 21 doubles and 18 homers while driving in 54 and defensively at third base, Sandberg played well. Sandberg joined Aubrey Huff in 2002 as the first two Devil Rays homegrown players to hit 18 or more home runs in a season.

Sandberg was back on the team to begin the 2003 season at age 25, and he didn’t exactly get off to a staggering start in 55 games, but he was doing a bunch of things, posting a .213/.305/.434 line with 10 doubles, 6 homers, 23 RBI, and even better defense at third base. However, the Rays grew impatient with him and sent him down back down to Durham. Sandberg bounced around from the Rays organization to the Red Sox to the Astros to the Indians to the Royals before retiring after the 2007 season at age 29.

Jared Sandberg was a player the Devil Rays probably drafted just for his name. But he had a chance to be a much better player than he became. He hit for power, played great defense, and had an excellent baseball IQ. He was a power hitter who laid down 5 sac bunts without a single unsuccessful one because the team asked him to. He endured injuries and the speed part of his game disappeared, but he kept fighting. If the Rays got a player like Sandberg today, they would firstly try to get him to be a lot more patient at the plate, but even if that didn’t work, he had the ability to be a good utilityman thanks to the tools he did have. It just didn’t work out for Sandberg.

Sandberg has now managed in the Rays organization the past four years, first with the Advanced Rookie Princeton Rays and then with the Short Season-A Hudson Valley Renegades. Sandberg is now 119-110 including 7-4 in 2012. He is sharing his baseball knowledge with the prospects he manages and tries to help each of them become the player that he could never be.