Keppinger has gotten off to a horrific start, but the good news is that he’s beginning to break out of it. In his last 3 games, he has gone 2 for 4 each time, raising his batting average from .153 to .202. But there’s still plenty of reason for concern. Kepppinger is showing no plate discipline at all, with his batting average higher than his on-base percentage as he hasn’t walked or gotten hit by a pitch but has 2 sac flies. You have to think that this won’t persist, but as it stands right now, Keppinger is the 21st player, the first since Midre Cummings in 1996, to have a greater batting average than OBP after 85 plate appearances. He’s just the sixth non-pitcher. And that lack of selectivity hasn’t just affected Keppinger’s ability to hit the ball with any authority as his isolated power is just .024. He’s actually hitting a lot of line drives, 29% of his batted balls compared to the 21% league average, but his BAbip (batting average on balls in play) on those line drives is just .591, well below the league average of .679. He’s not getting any hits on groundballs either, managing just a .133 BAbip compared to the .223 average, and he doesn’t have a single hit on a flyball all year, obviously below the .103 league BAbip. On the whole, Keppinger’s BAbip is just .221, well below the .292 league average. Maybe he’s coming around now, but didn’t it seem like at the beginning of the year, Keppinger had just completely fallen apart? Don’t all those difference in BAbip seem so significant? In fact, they’re not.

The probability of Keppinger managing a BAbip as low he did on line drives was actually .188, a little less likely than 1 in 5, something that’s well within the range of normal. For groundballs, the probability was .098, less likely but also not a significant value. On flyballs, we have our first significant p-value (probability value) at .045, and that’s something that we can attempt to explain because when non-power hitters hit too many flyballs, the results are not good, even if they’re certainly due for more than the zero hits Keppinger has gotten. And overall on the year, Keppinger’s BAbip of .221 isn’t significantly lower than the league average, coming in at a p-value of .085. What does all of this tell us? On the whole, Jeff Keppinger has really just been a victim of terribly bad luck, and that’s what has torn apart the rest of his game.

In the face of Keppinger’s improbable breakout in 2012, his struggles to begin 2013 are very funny from a statistical perspective. It can be viewed as a regression to the mean, an extreme value above what we would expect being canceled out by an extreme value going the other way. But regression to the mean isn’t quite that magical and that convenient, and the big statistical point here is something different. There’s a concept in statistics that if you run enough statistical tests, some are going to be significant by chance alone. If you think of every player in baseball as a statistical test, it’s clear that some of them are going to have breakout years or disastrous ones simply because of luck. When a player does have one of those years, it’s up to teams to figure out whether it was because of a real breakthrough or decline or just a case of fortune playing games with us. And if you want to assess whether a player has really broken through, sometimes the stats don’t tell the entire story–watch him play and see if anything really has changed.

The case of Keppinger demonstrates just how crazy luck can be and that we should remain levelheaded both when players are doing surprisingly well or suspiciously not. Sometimes, for reasons out of our control, a player like Keppinger can have a shocking breakout year, and we just have to realize that the supposed breakthrough may not be real. Rays fans wish Keppinger nothing but the best for Keppinger over the next three years (except, of course, when he plays the Rays). But even while we basked in the glory of his 2012 season with the Rays, we can acknowledge that he was not nearly as good as he played and that maybe he just got lucky. We can also be confident, though, that Keppinger is substantially better than he has played in the early goings of 2013 and that his numbers by the end of this year will indicate that. Even if he won’t be a star for the White Sox like he was during his brief time with the Rays, Keppinger can at least be a solid player like he has been most of his career. A great season last year and a tough start to this year doesn’t change that one bit.

What’s the logic behind refusing to negotiate following the deadline to exchange figures? According to MLB Trade Rumors and a quote that Blue Jays GM Alex Anthopolous made to MLB.com’s Jordan Bastian, the reasoning is to get deals done as quickly as possible and take all possible steps to avoid a hearing. That sounds good in theory, but what impact does it make when push comes to shove? To try to ascertain that, let’s look at the data for arbitration hearings from 1998, which we’ll use since it’s when the Rays first came into being, up to and including the hearings from 2012 (we won’t use this year because we still don’t know which players will actually have hearings and which ones will agree to deals beforehand). We’ll compare how the five “File and Trial” teams have done versus the rest of baseball in two categories: the average number of hearings, since teams want to go through as few hearings as possible, and winning percentage when cases do go to hearings, and see whether the “File and Trial” strategy truly makes an impact.

Since 1998, there have been 106 arbitration hearings between the 30 MLB teams. The average number of hearings per team was 3.53. Among the “File and Trial” teams, though, the average was actually higher, coming in at 3.8 hearings per team. Since 1998, teams have won 70 hearings and lost 36, a .660 winning percentage. For the five “File and Trial” teams, their winning percentage was just .579. Looking at that data, it seems clear that while the ”File and Trial” theory works seems to make on paper, it doesn’t actually work in practice and in fact makes the teams that employ it do worse. But before we conclude that, let’s look at this table, which lists the arbitration statistics for each MLB team from 1998 to 2012 (the ”File and Trial” teams have their names written in black).

Looking at the teams in black, one immediately sticks out: the Marlins. While the other four ”File and Trial” teams averaged just 2.5 hearings per team, the Marlins had 9, second in all of baseball to only the Washington Nationals (who had been the Montreal Expos before 2005). And while the other four teams went a combined 8-2, the Marlins went just 3-6, the worst record of any team that had more than three cases go to a hearing. A common sentiment the past several years is that the Marlins have run their team in a “questionable fashion.” This appears to be another example of exactly that. They stubbornly keep this strategy going even though it hasn’t worked for them and seemingly are unafraid to go to hearings despite losing far more often then they win.

Moving on, are the results of the other four ”File and Trial” significantly better than the rest of MLB? The answer is that it’s too soon to tell. The sample size is so small (we’re talking about just 10 hearings from these four teams) and the probability of them doing as well as they did if their true average number of hearings and true winning percentage was really the same as the MLB average was .246 for mean number of hearings and .175 for winning percentage, meaning results as different as what these four teams have recorded are uncommon but still within the range of normal. But even among these four teams, we see a difference between the Rays and the other three teams. The Blue Jays, Braves, and White Sox combined for just 5 hearings between them, an average of 1.67 hearings that is pretty significant, occurring in just 6.5% of samples of the true average should have been 3.53 (although it isn’t significant on an α=.95 significance level). The Blue Jays were just two teams (the Indians were the other) that didn’t go to a single hearing, while the White Sox joined them as one of eight who went through one or less. However, they went just 2-2 when they did go to hearings, which, while far from significant, is noticeably less than the overall winning percentage of .660 by the 30 MLB teams. The Rays, on the other hand, went to 6 hearings, nearly double the average, but won all six, which is significantly better than the .660 MLB proportion and would have 25-to-1 odds of occurring if they really should have won 66% of the time. It seems that while the Blue Jays, Braves, and White Sox focus on avoiding hearings whenever possible to make things easier for them and the players, the Rays take a different approach. Essentially, as the deadline to exchange salary figures approaches, the Rays tell their players something like this: “Here’s our final offer. You don’t have to take it and we can go to hearing, but know that if you do that, we’ll beat you and you’ll regret not taking this offer.” When players have obstinately refused, the Rays have blown them away every time. When I talked about what I thought Matt Joyce and Ryan Roberts should receive in arbitration, I guessed a few thousand dollars too high on both of them. While that could have been simply luck, I later noticed something I had mistakenly assumed, that the Rays would give them a little bit more money in order to avoid a hearing. The truth was, in fact, the exact opposite- Joyce and Roberts took less from the Rays knowing that the Rays were going to beat them at the hearing if they didn’t.

The “FIle and Trial” strategy regarding arbitration-eligible players does not work for every MLB team (Marlins, we’re looking at you). For most teams, the concept of purposely letting time where you could be continuing to negotiate doesn’t seem to make much sense. However, for teams that want to do everything possible to avoid hearings or, in the case of the Rays, want to use the seemingly inevitable conclusion of the players losing in hearings to try to get them to sign for less money, the early returns appear to show that it’s a viable method. Sometimes even the best-laid plans go to waste- the Braves are set to go to arbitration with Martin Prado this year after not agreeing to a deal before the exchange of figures deadline- but in the hands of the right teams and the right front office personnel, it can pay dividends in the long-term.

Bryan Anderson, White Sox- Anderson, who turned 26 earlier this month, got into 25 with the Cardinals between 2010 and 2012, hitting .273 in 49 plate appearances, and was a solid hitter for years in the Cardinals system, managing a .285/.350/.405 line, before falling off to .225/.302/.317 in 2012. Anderson has been an interesting prospect for a while thanks to a fluid lefty swing and flashes of power to go along with solid defense behind the plate. However, Anderson’s power has never been something he’s been able to put into use on a consistent basis, hitting just 14 homers combined in the two years since he set a career-high with 12 homers in 2010. Anderson has featured a solid approach at the plate, maybe being a touch overaggressive, but he lost his groove in 2012 as he struck out 86 times versus just 36 walks, although frustration over not being at Triple-A for the fifth straight season was likely a factor. Anderson has struggled versus left-handed pitching the last two years, managing just a .190/.256/.260 line, and it’s clear that there’s risk with him offensively, but he has hit to a solid .260/.334/.387 line at Triple-A in over 1500 Triple-A plate appearances and has been agitating for a big league job for years. Defensively, Anderson’s arm is just average but he moves well behind the plate and looks to be an average defender. Anderson is coming off a tough year for the Cardinals, but he could be a player with the ability to be an above-average major league catcher or at least a platoon player if he’s given a chance. The White Sox have some uncertainty at the catcher position as they decide whether to re-sign A.J. Pierzynski or to give Tyler Flowers their starting job, and Anderson gives them a player who could potentially compete with Flowers and Josh Phegley for big league time if Pierzynski departs.

(Replacing Anderson in the Cardinals system is J.R. Towles, who we discussed in Part 1.)

Luke Montz, Athletics- Looking at his numbers, Montz immediately attracts your attention as a catcher who hit 29 homers at Triple-A New Orleans in the Marlins organization last year. However, even as he hit all those homers, his line was just .222/.310/.495. Montz, 29, is a Quad-A slugger type of player, having nice power but a swing that gets too long and a patient approach at the plate but sub-par pitch recognition. If Montz was a first baseman like that, he’d be overlooked, but as a catcher he’s a little interesting. Defensively, though, Montz has long been regarded as a poor defensive catcher and actually played more first base than catcher in 2012 so he’s going to have to work to get his defense passable before he can seriously think about a big league job given his skill-set. Montz is a relatively similar player as current Athletics catcher Derek Norris as a catcher with power from the right side but also strikeout problems that will limit his ability to hit for average. The major differences between them are that Montz is 5 years older and his plate discipline and defense are both worse. The Athletics finished 2012 with a platoon of Norris and George Kottaras and appear to be continuing that for next season. Montz will play at Triple-A behind that pairing with the opportunity present for him to receive big league time at some point.

Matt Pagnozzi, Braves- Pagnozzi is a former big leaguer from 2009 to 2011 with the Cardinals, Rockies, and Pirates, and the gist with him is that he’s a good defensive catcher who has thrown out 36% of attempted basestealers over the course of his minor league career and has solid receiving skills as well but he’s never really hit, managing just a .220/.300/.312 line in the minors. Pagnozzi may actually be more impressive as a pitcher. Pagnozzi has made just 3 appearances as a pitcher in his career, one each in 2004, 2008, and 2012 (every Leap Year?), and has been great, not allowing a single run in 4.1 innings and striking out 3 while walking none. Obviously this is an extremely small sample size, but Pagnozzi has a nice arm and his career as a catcher doesn’t appear to be going very far, so why not try him on the mound? The chances of that happening are pretty slim, but it’s hard to find a position player with 3 or more pitching appearances as good as Pagnozzi. Assuming he remains a catcher, Pagnozzi will provide depth behind Brian McCann and Gerald Laird for the Braves.

Manny Pina, Royals- Teams were bound to have interest in Pina, but the Royals quickly re-signed him back on November 6th. Pina, 25, has gotten into 5 games with the Royals the last two years and could make a bigger impact for the team next season. Pina suffered through a lost 2012 as he was out until late June after surgery on the meniscus in his right knee. Pina did get into one major league game by the time the season ended, but appeared in just 49 minor league games, not a single one at Triple-A as he spent most of his time at Double-A. Pina is regarded as a very good defensive catcher thanks to smooth actions and a strong arm. He has thrown at 36% of attempted basestealers in his minor league career and was all the way up 51% in 2012. Offensively is where Pina’s game is more questionable as he has a .252/.326/.363 career line. However, Pina has really improved his plate discipline the last three years, posting a 110-93 strikeout to walk ratio compared to 120-53 the previous three years. He does have very little experience at Triple-A, just 85 games and 319 plate appearances, so he could use one more year to polish his abilities. He’ll never be great offensively, but he has the ability to hit for a serviceable average and OBP given his defense, and maybe even hit 5 or 6 home runs. The Royals have to be looking at Pina as their backup of the future behind Salvador Perez, and he could be a nice complement to Perez’s abilities if he can stay healthy and prove that he can hit well enough at higher levels.

The bottom line on catchers is that if one shows any promise, their team will be hard-pressed to let them go. The minor league catcher market is almost never flush with talent, but sometimes players slip through the cracks and become productive players in other organizations. All these signings are nice for the teams that execute them because they’re low-risk gambles with the ability for considerable upside in some cases, and these teams hope to see to signees take the steps forward they need to contribute for them in the big leagues next season.