On December 3, 2007, the Rays traded outfielder Elijah Dukes to the Washington Nationals for right-handed pitching prospect Glenn Gibson. The Rays knew Dukes was talented- but they also knew that his attitude problems made him enigmatic and also reduced the morale of his teammates. They decided to deal him, receiving a good pitching prospect in Gibson in return with a solid sinker, a plus changeup, and a good curveball. Gibson never panned out in the Rays organization and they wound up releasing him, but it showed us that the Rays were willing to take risks to put together a winning ballclub even if meant trading promising players.

On December 10, 2008, the Rays dealt right-hander Edwin Jackson to the Detroit Tigers for outfielder Matt Joyce. Jackson was a 25 year old right-hander with electric stuff coming off a 14-win season, albeit with a 4.42 ERA, and the Rays were willing to trade him for a promising outfielder in Joyce, but one who had just debuted in the big leagues in 2008. Most teams have a bias toward their guys and even when they struggle, they keep with them seeing their promise. But the Rays knew that there was no guarantee that Jackson would improve and that they had plenty of pitching depth with bigger needs elsewhere*, and they were willing to pull the trigger even though casual fans would not believe that they would trade a pitcher who tied for their team lead in wins. The winner of that trade is debatable, but when you consider that the Rays had plenty of pitching and Joyce gave them a huge offensive season in 2011 and strong performance in 2010 and 2012 as well, the Rays definitely are happy with their end of the deal.

*Sure, the Rays have pitching depth and bigger needs elsewhere now as well, but they don’t have a pitcher anywhere near as enigmatic as Jackson was in 2012 and are confident that all their starters can pitch well for them next season if they are retained and don’t feel a need to sell-high.

Those two moves were vintage moves the Rays would make, taking calculated risks to give their team the best long-term reward. The move they made on December 11, 2009 was quite a bit more surprising as they traded Jesse Chavez, who they had just acquired in November for Akinori Iwamura, to the Atlanta Braves for Rafael Soriano and signed him to a one-year, 7.25 million dollar contract. Soriano was coming off a great season for the Braves in 2009, posting a 2.97 ERA, a 102-27 strikeout to walk ratio, and 27 saves, but he had made just 14 appearances in 2008 after dealing with injury problems all year and then undergoing surgery on his right pitching elbow to remove bone spurs. If Soriano had gotten hurt again, the Rays would have been in trouble. Instead, they took a chance knowing that they needed an effective late inning arm to contend after J.P. Howell was lost to the year to shoulder surgery, and the results were remarkable as Soriano posted a 1.73 ERA and 45 saves to help the Rays win the AL East division title.

The Winter Meetings presents the Rays with plenty opportunities for potential deals. Most of the time, they don’t take them for a variety of reasons. But in these trades, the Rays saw opportunities for upside and seized them, something they did once again today when they signed James Loney. The Rays don’t carry out trades during the Winter Meetings if they think that they can find a better value at a later time. But if the right player becomes available or the offer comes along, anything can happen and it will be interesting to see exactly what will.

This offseason, the Rays seem extremely likely to offer Upton a qualifying offer for one year and 13.3 million dollars so they can receive a draft pick when Upton signs elsewhere. Jackson took a similar contract with the Nationals hoping that the one extra year before free agency would be enough for him to finally establish himself as a topflight pitcher, but it did not work out. You would think that Upton might be a candidate for the same type of contract, but that will not be the case as there will be better offers available and there is more faith around baseball in Upton’s abilities. And considering how Jackson’s one-year contract backfired, you can rest assured that Upton will take the security of a multi-year deal knowing that he has did everything possible with the Rays to get his maximum free agent value and the next step for him will be prove that the money he receives will be worth it for the team that signs him.

(No-Hitters For/NH= no-hitters thrown by that team, No-Hitters Against/NHA= no-hitters thrown against that team)

The Rays getting no-hit 4 times in 2281 amounts to a .00180 no-hitters against to total games ratio, nearly three times the league average of .0006517 across baseball and .0006727 per team. Given the sample size of 2281 games, not insignificant at all, the probability of that occurring by chance alone is just .016, meaning that we can say with 98% confidence (at an α=.02 significance level) that the true proportion that the Rays should be no-hit is higher than the league proportion. The only team within the Rays’ stratosphere in terms of proportion of games in which they got no-hit was the San Diego Padres, and even they were 55.6% less. Why do the Rays get no-hit so often?

The knee-jerk reaction is to say that the Rays get no-hit so often is pure offensive ineptitude. Indeed, the 2002 Devil Rays were absolutely pathetic as they lost 106 games and finished 12th in the AL in batting average, 13th in OBP, and 14th in slugging percentage. But in 2009 and 2010, the Rays were not that bad, finishing 4th in the AL in OPS in 2009 and 8th in the AL in OPS in 2010. However, even in 2009 they finished 8th in batting average, and in 2010 they were a ghastly 13th. The Rays have gotten on base on hit for some solid power the last  handful of years, but they haven’t succeeded at making contact. In 2009, the Rays ranked 2nd in the AL in strikeouts while in 2010 they led the league. When they put the ball into play those two years, they actually got hits more often that average, posting a .303 BAbip in 2009 compared to the .299 league average and a .295 BAbip in 2010 compared to the .293 league average. However, the Rays’ hits were more dependent on power and flyballs than your average MLB team. In 2009, the Rays hit 48.9% of their batted balls in the air, exempting balls classified line drives, compared to the league average of 47.5%. In 2010, 51.7% of the Rays batted balls were non-line drive flyballs compared to the 46.8% league average. The Rays’ line drive rates were right around average during those two seasons, but their increased dependence on flyballs kept their team batting average down. That also left them more vulnerable to no-hitters.

Let’s quantify that by delving into the perfect games themselves. On April 27th, 2002, Derek Lowe no-hit the Devil Rays in a 10-0 Red Sox victory. He walked one batter, Brent Abernathy leading off the 3rd inning, while striking out 6. He allowed 13 groundballs, 8 flyballs, and not a single line drive, all of which obviously turned into outs. Good batted ball splits data isn’t available from 2002 from Baseball-Reference, so we’ll just tip our cap to Lowe and move on to the more recent no-no’s against the Rays, where the data is available.

Being a flyball hitting team doesn’t just mean that you hit for a lower BAbip overall. If you’re attempting the hit the ball in the air and instead hit a groundball, it’s more likely to be a routine play rather than a groundball of the harder variety. For example, in 2009, major league hitters posted a .236 BAbip on groundballs, a .138 BAbip on flyballs (illustrating how hitting too many flyballs brings your batting average down), and a .726 BAbip on line drives. The 2009 Rays had a .229 BAbip on groundballs despite their speed, a .119 BAbip on flyballs, indicating that they were uppercutting for additional power but often getting under pitches (more of their flyballs went for home runs compared to the league average as well), and a .731 BAbip on line drives. Based on those batted ball tendencies, let’s break down how likely Humber’s ex-teammate Mark Buerhle’s 2009 perfect game and no-hitter was likely to happen versus the Rays compared to your average 2009 MLB team.

Buerhle struck out 6 in his perfect game, and he allowed 11 groundballs, 8 flyballs, and 2 line drives in the process, all of which were caught (especially in the case of the Dewayne Wise play, Buerhle was definitely lucky). Based on the Rays’ BAbip’s, the probability of 11 straight groundballs going for outs was .0572. The probability of 8 straight flyballs going for outs was .363. And the probability of two straight line drives being gloved was .072. Multiplying those together, we get a probability of .0015 that Buerhle’s no-hitter (and perfect game) would occur based on the batted balls he allowed. That seems very small, but for the league average, the probability of a no-hitter occuring was .0012, a 27% difference. The odds of the Rays actually getting no-hit was still extremely small, but it gave Buerhle a slight edge, and with some help from luck and outstanding defense, the perfect game did indeed happen.

When Dallas Braden perfect-gamed the Rays on 5/9/10, he struck out 6 and allowed 7 groundballs, 9 flyballs, and 5 line drives. Based on the Rays’ BAbip by batted ball type (.228 on groundballs, .124 on flyballs, and .733 on line drives), the probability of the Rays getting no-hit (and perfect-gamed) was .000067 (it was so low because of the five line drives). Based on the league BAbip tendencies based on hit trajectory (.234 on groundballs, .138 on flyballs, and .718 on line drives, the probability of Braden throwing a no-hitter based on the batted balls he allowed was .000073, actually a bit higher, but that was purely because Braden allowed line drives, the only batted ball type (other than bunts) that the Rays were above the league average, and even so, the values were the same to five decimal places, illustrating just how poor the Rays BAbip tendencies were on groundballs and flyballs.

And now we get to the bizarre case of Edwin Jackson’s no-hitter against his former team which occurred on June 25th of that same 2010 season. He used a scary 149 pitches in his 9 frames, walking 8, hitting two more batters, and striking out (you guessed it) 6 without allowing a single hit. (What are the odds that in all four no-hitters against the Rays, the pitcher struck out 6?) Jackson allowed 11 groundballs, 8 flyballs, and 2 line drives. Using the same BAbip tendencies above, the probability of the Rays getting no-hit in this one was .00143. For the league, it was .00129. That’s an 11% difference.

The pitching is fine without you, Matt, but we’ll never forget your no-hitter. (Credit: Matthew Emmons-US PRESSWIRE)

But we can’t end this post without talking about the one no-hitter that went the Rays way: Matt Garza‘s gem on July 26th, 2010 versus the Detroit Tigers. Garza faced the minimum 27 as he allowed just 1 walk in his 9 no-hit frames, striking out 6 (unbelievable!). He allowed 8 groundballs, 12 flyballs, and 3 line drives. The Tigers posted a .268 BAbip on groundballs, a .109 mark on flyballs, and a .692 BAbip on liners. The probability of Garza tossing his no-hitter versus the Tigers was .00196, but probably slightly higher when factoring in the Rays’ outstanding defense. Against a league average BAbip team, the probability of Garza’s no-no occurring was .00159, a 23% difference. A lot of things had to go right for Garza’s no-hitter to happen, but good thing it did. Otherwise we’d be staring at a team that had succumbed to a record ratio of no-hitters without tossing a single one themselves.

So the Rays are somewhat susceptible to no-hitters. They’re also at risk, as we see much more often, for nonexistent offensive performances. The Rays offense is at times very inconsistent. Sometimes it looks completely overmatched even against so-so pitching and at other times we think to ourselves “when did the offense get this good?” Luckily, the Rays offense is good enough for them to be a team that has made the playoffs 3 of the last 4 years and has a chance to be as good and even better this season. This no-hitters business is just something to laugh about- although another no-hitter, with one of our pitchers doing the honors, would be nice.